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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960414-CA 
v. : 
STEVEN E. STRAHM, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant, Steven E. Strahm, appeals his conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R. 136). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where nothing suggested to the trial court that trial 
counsel had a conflict of interest, did the trial court 
erroneously fail to inquire into whether a conflict existed? 
2. Where defendant claims counsel's performance affected 
his decision not to accept a plea offer, but the case law 
precludes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that 
basis and no record supports the factual assertion, has defendant 
1 
established that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel? 
Defendant's claims present questions of law reviewed on the 
trial record because defendant raises them for the first time on 
direct appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing. State v. 
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103 
(1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-103 (1995) (R. 6). A jury convicted defendant of the charged 
crime (R. 13 6, 139). The trial court sentenced defendant to the 
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years, and imposed a $2,000 
fine plus an eighty-five percent surcharge (R. 141). The trial 
court also imposed a firearm enhancement not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively with defendant's sentence (R. 142). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 146). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The historical facts have little relevance to this case. 
Briefly, defendant threatened another driver with a gun during a 
2 
traffic dispute (R. 174-77, 204-208). 
In late October 1995, it became apparent that defendant's 
attorney, Mr. Mark Moffat, would have to testify on defendant's 
behalf (R. 63, 242-51, 259-60)-1 By order dated November 3, 
1995, the trial court struck the trial date, allowed Mr. Moffat 
to withdraw, and appointed Mr. Patrick Anderson to represent 
defendant (R. 69). The trial court rescheduled trial for 
December 11, 1995 (R. 72).2 
On December 11, 1995, the first day of trial, defendant 
moved to have another attorney appointed, and Mr. Anderson moved 
to withdraw from representing defendant (R. 77). However, when 
defendant discovered that replacing Mr. Anderson would delay his 
trial until February, he opted to go to trial on the following 
day with Mr. Anderson (R. 162-64). 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
xMr. Moffat's testimony became necessary for reasons 
unrelated to the appellate issues. Briefly, Mr. Moffat testified 
in order to discredit the testimony of a State's witness who had 
originally given Mr. Moffat a version of the events that 
exonerated defendant (id.). 
defendant misrepresents that the substitution of counsel 
took place on the "eve of trial." Appellant's Brief at 2. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Ineffective assistance (conflict of interest). 
Defendant concedes that the record demonstrates no actual 
conflict of interest, but argues that a statement made by trial 
counsel triggered the trial court's duty to inquire into whether 
a conflict existed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant 
counsel who will not subordinate defendant's interests to his own 
or another client's. Nothing in this record suggested that that 
might happen; therefore, nothing triggered the trial court's duty 
to inquire into a potential conflict that would violate 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. The 
statement on which defendant relies establishes, at most, that 
defendant and trial counsel had difficulty getting along. 
Because the Sixth Amendment does not protect defendant against 
personality conflicts with his appointed counsel, that statement 
did not require the trial court to explore the possibility of a 
conflict of interest. 
2. Ineffective assistance. Defendant contends that his 
trial counsel represented him ineffectively because they did not 
caution him that the State could seek a firearm enhancement to 
his sentence. Defendant contends that, had he known about the 
enhancement, he could have given the State's plea offer more 
4 
serious consideration. This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, defendant cannot predicate an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on his failure to accept a plea bargain. Second, 
the record contains no support for his factual assertion. 
Without record support, his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE NOTHING SUGGESTED TO THE TRIAL COURT THAT TRIAL# 
COUNSEL HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY MADE NO INQUIRY INTO WHETHER ONE EXISTED 
Defendant contends that statements made by his trial 
:~unsel, Mr. Anderson, triggered the trial court's duty to 
inquire whether Mr. Anderson had a conflict of interest. 
Appellant's Brief at 5. Defendant concedes, however, that the 
record demonstrates no clear conflict of interest. Id. 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggested that a conflict 
existed; therefore, nothing triggered the trial court's duty to 
inquire whether Mr. Anderson had a conflict of interest. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant representation by 
conflict-free counsel. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 
1990). That right guarantees defendant counsel who will pursue 
his interests over those of anyone else. See, e.g.. Cuyler v. 
5 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-51 (1980) (giving an example of 
counsel representing multiple clients and promoting one client's 
interests to the detriment of the other's interests). This Court 
has recognized that a conflict violating a defendant's right to 
conflict-free counsel may arise where counsel represents multiple 
defendants with conflicting interests, or where counsel's 
personal interests conflict with defendant's. See State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488-90 (Utah App. 1991). In Johnson, for 
example, this Court found that counsel's interest in exonerating 
himself from the same crime with which the State had charged his 
client conflicted with defending his client. Id. at 490. 
When a trial court becomes aware of a potential conflict, it 
must take adequate steps to resolve the issue; if it does not, 
the appellate courts presume prejudice and reverse. Id.: State 
v. Velarde. 806 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah App. 1991). However, 
"
x[a]bsent special circumstances'" trial courts may assume that 
no conflict exists. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 72 (quoting 
Cnyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980)). 
In order to have triggered the trial court's duty to inquire 
into a potential conflict, something must have suggested to the 
trial court that Mr. Anderson might subordinate defendant's 
interests to his own interests or the interests of another 
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client. When defendant asked for a new attorney, he based his 
request on his claims that Mr. Anderson: 1) did not contact the 
jail to assure that defendant could have a haircut and scissors 
to trim his mustache; 2) did not get clothes for court in time 
for defendant to try them on, and the clothes he brought did not 
fit; 3) did not schedule a meeting where Mr. Anderson, Mr. 
Moffat, and he could discuss the case together; and 4) did not 
know until three days before trial that defendant had a day 
planner identifying the discrepancies in the preliminary hearing 
(R. 159-61).3 In support of his motion to withdraw, Mr. Anderson 
stated, UI believe it would be in Mr. Strahm's best interest to 
allow him to fire me or to allow me to withdraw. I feel due to 
some things that Mr. Strahm like if the trial went forth today, I 
would not effectively represent him, and it would be in his best 
interests and interest of justice to allow him to withdraw" (R. 
161-62). The transcript of the entire hearing is attached as 
addendum B. 
Nothing that either defendant or Mr. Anderson told the trial 
court suggested that Mr. Anderson would subordinate defendant's 
30n appeal, defendant represents that he asked for new 
counsel in part because he and Mr. Anderson could not agree on 
which witnesses Mr. Anderson should contact. Appellant's Brief 
at 3. Nothing in the record supports this representation. 
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interests to his own or another client's. Defendant's complaints 
merely demonstrated defendant's general dissatisfaction with 
counsel's performance.4 
Similarly, Mr. Anderson stated only that he could not 
represent defendant effectively. At most, that statement might 
be interpreted to suggest that Mr. Anderson did not feel 
adequately prepared (an interpretation that the record refutes).5 
That statement does not suggest that Mr. Anderson would have 
subordinated defendant's interests to his own or another 
client's. 
Moreover, Mr. Anderson's statement that he could not 
effectively represent defendant immediately followed defendant's 
complaints that Mr. Anderson had not performed services that 
defendant thought Mr. Anderson should perform. When read 
together, defendant's complaints and Mr. Anderson's statement 
4Moreover, defendant has not relied on his own statements to 
the trial court to support his argument that the trial court 
should have inquired into a potential conflict. Appellant's 
Brief at 4-5. 
5When the trial court denied Mr. Anderson's motion to 
withdraw, the court stated, "You are prepared" (R. 164). Neither 
Mr. Anderson nor defendant disputed the trial court's statement. 
Moreover, Mr. Anderson extensively cross-examined the State's 
witnesses (R. 179-99, 200-202, 213-22, 226-28, 233-36) and 
presented a defense witness to discredit the testimony of one of 
the State's key witnesses. 
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establish that Mr. Anderson believed he could not represent 
defendant because they were not getting along. Personality 
conflicts do not equate to conflicts of interest that violate 
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel. See People v. 
Burchette. 628 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (111. App. 1993)("[w]e cannot 
equate a 'personality clash' with a conflict or potential 
conflict of interest"). 
Finally, the circumstances of this case did not suggest the 
existence of a possible conflict. Mr. Anderson did not represent 
multiple clients charged with the same crime and was not also 
charged with or under investigation for the same crime that the 
State had charged against defendant. Compare Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. at 349-51 (counsel represented multiple clients); State 
v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 488-90 (counsel under investigation for 
same crime with which state had charged Johnson). 
Because nothing suggested to the trial court that Mr. 
Anderson had a conflict of interest, nothing triggered the trial 
court's duty to inquire whether such a conflict existed. 
Therefore, the trial court's failure to inquire into a possible 
conflict of interest does not state a basis for reversal. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM 
FAILS BECAUSE HE ERRONEOUSLY PREDICATES THE CLAIM ON 
HIS FAILURE TO CONSIDER A PLEA OFFER AND BECAUSE NO 
RECORD SUPPORTS HIS FACTUAL ASSERTION 
In order to establish that he did not receive the level of 
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant must 
establish two elements. First, he must identify the specific 
acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 
690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994). Second, he must affirmatively 
prove that the challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence 
in the outcome of his criminal trial. Strickland v. Washington. 
466 U.S. at 694; Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 522. 
However, this Court "may consider an ineffective assistance 
claim on direct appeal only if the record is adequate to permit a 
decision. A trial record is adequate only if 'we are not aware 
of any evidence or arguments which might be made that is not now 
before us.'" State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
entirely on his assertion that counsel did not inform him that he 
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faced the possibility of a firearm enhancement. Defendant 
asserts that he would have given the State's plea offer more 
serious consideration had he known about the possible 
enhancement. Appellant's Brief at 6-8. 
Defendant's argument fails for two independent reasons. 
First, defendant cannot predicate his ineffectiveness claim on 
h.i3 failure to accept a plea bargain. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 
913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987). In Knight. the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected Knight's argument that his counsel could not represent 
him effectively in the plea process because a discovery violation 
deprived counsel of information necessary to advise him about 
accepting or rejecting a plea offer. Id. The Court noted that 
it had ''previously rejected claims alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea 
bargain and has retained his or her right to a fair trial." Id. 
Second, the record supports none of defendant's factual 
assertions. The record contains no evidence that counsel did not 
inform defendant about the possible firearm enhancement, that the 
State had made any plea offer, or even that defendant would have 
chosen the plea offer over going to trial had he known about the 
11 
possible enhancement.6 Without any record support for his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that claim fails. Id. 
See also State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 292-93 
(Utah)(appellate court's cannot consider claims that depend upon 
missing portions of the record), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 
(1982); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 
1992)(u[i]n the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we 
cannot address the issues raised and presume the correctness of 
the disposition made by the trial court")/ overruled on other 
grounds. 913 P.2d 350, 357 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that 
the Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17 - day of Qouu , / 9 ? 7 < 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
o 
^^Cri^V*^ i^<^T^-^\^ 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
defendant failed to seek a remand pursuant to rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop this factual 
record. 
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Todd D. Gardner 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-103 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assault against peace officer. 
Evidence of assault 
—Sufficient 
Cited. 
Assault against peace officer. 
This section and § 76-5*102.4 do not pro-
scribe identical conduct when the assault is 
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to 
different classes of persons, the former apply* 
ing to "any person" and the latter applying to 
"any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 
(Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Evidence of assault 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the 
videotape of all bookings, including the defen-
dant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if 
there was no request to retain it, and the 
defendant sought dismissal of the charge that 
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police 
officer, because there was no showing that loss 
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue 
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in 
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez, 
761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
—Sufficient 
Jury verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory 
defenses of self-defense and defense of habita-
tion, was supported by the evidence. State v. 
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah 
Ct App. 1994). 
76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other 
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.6, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 149, § 1; 1994, ch. 37, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, inserted "or other-
wise propels." 
Effective Dates, — Laws 1992, ch. 59 be-
came effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Spitting. 
Spitting on a correctional officer was not a 
crime under this section, as the only prohibited 
means of propelling a substance or object was 
by throwing. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah 
Ct App. 1993) (decided before 1994 amendment 
adding "or otherwise propels"). 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5*103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 
1989, ch. 170, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Attempt, J 76-4-101. 
Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
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0 0 0 * 5 * 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Steven Strahm 
3 951900347. Appearances, please. 
4 I MR. LEMCKE: Howard Lemcke for the State. 
5 State is here and prepared to proceed. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: Patrick Anderson for Mr. 
7 Strahm, Your Honor. As I have indicated to the court, we 
8 need to address, I guess, a joint motion. Defendant has 
9 asked for a new attorney. I would make a motion to 
10 withdraw as counsel for Mr. Strahm. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, why do you want 
12 another lawyer? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I have asked my 
14 attorney a couple simple things before this trial today. 
15 I asked him if he could call the jail, make sure I would 
16 be able to get a haircut, use a pair of scissors to trim 
17 my mustache, look presentable in front of the court. I 
18 also asked him if he could bring some clothes since I have 
19 not been granted bail that I could reach to get on the 
20 outside to take care of these things on my own, and I 
21 never did receive the chance to try these clothes on until 
22 this morning. When they are brought up, the clothes they 
23 brought me did not fit, the clothes they brought again 
24 didn't fit, and then I was asked to wear the clothes that 
25 I was arrested in in this courtroom, which were wrinkled. 
1 The shirt was wrinkled. I feel like if I am going to a 
2 jury trial, I should at least look presentable. And I 
3 feel like either Mr. Anderson is too busy or something 
4 else is going on. I don't want to put the blame anywhere, 
5 but I felt like someone should have brought the clothes to 
6 where I could have tried them on before the trial. I also 
7 felt like I should have been able to have a haircut and 
8 use a pair of scissors instead of having to use a razor in 
9 a jail cell to get ready for a trial. Also, there's been 
10 a few other things I have asked him to do on the outside 
11 to contact the bank, to make arrangements to where I could 
12 get money on my books and that's never been done. Mr. 
13 Anderson was good enough to take twenty dollars out of his 
14 pocket and put it on my books, which I appreciate. I told 
15 him I would pay him back, but I also feel the attorney 
16 that I have that I want to represent me on this I want it 
17 to be the same attorney that represents me on these other 
18 charges. 
19 THE COURT: Who represents you on the witness 
20 tampering? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: On the witness tampering 
22 charges because of the trial, the capital homicide I had, 
23 I was unable to try that case. So it was going to have to 
24 be a different attorney. I did the preliminary hearing in 
25 that case I was unable to represent him. 
1 THE COURT: No one has been assigned? 
2 MR. ANDERSON: Candace Johnson, someone in my 
3 office. Mr. Strahm indicates he wants another attorney. 
4 It will go to a different team on the conflict contract, 
5 Your Honor. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: There was one other reason, I 
7 was told Mr. Anderson and Mr. Moffat would have visited me 
8 at the jail to discuss this case. Now that Mr. Moffat is 
9 a witness for myself, Mr. Anderson was the only one that 
10 showed up. I don't see how I can get effective counsel if 
11 the witness who or my attorney who is now a witness and 
12 now my present attorney and I can't all sit down and 
13 discuss the case. Mr. Anderson didn't even know that I 
14 had a day planner that had all my notes in it of all the 
15 discrepancies from the preliminary hearing until two or 
16 three days ago. I just feel like I am not satisfied with 
17 that. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, anything else you 
19 would state for the record that allow me to delay this 
20 trial to change counsel? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: I believe it would be in Mr. 
22 Strahm's best interest to allow him to fire me or to allow 
23 me to withdraw. I feel due to some things that Mr. Strahm 
24 like if the trial went forth today, I would not 
25 effectively represent him, and it would be in his best 
1 interests and interest of justice to allow him to 
2 withdraw. 
3 THE COURT: Are you telling me as an officer 
4 of the court, the unspecified relationship I don't expect 
5 it to be discussed* You don't believe you could be 
6 effective counsel? 
7 MR. ANDERSON: That is correct. 
8 THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
9 MR. LEMCKE: Except, Your Honor, that you 
10 I know we have been here. We have had our witnesses now on 
11 a couple different occasions. It's difficult for them, we 
12 would expect that this would be, if nothing else, a waiver 
13 of speedy trial rights through actions of the defendant, 
14 he would not be allowed to complain about that. We would 
15 ask that although we note since he doesn't have a new 
16 attorney today, we could not schedule a trial today. 
17 j Would I be allowed some latitude in contacting my 
18 witnesses, if we need time when that is reset? 
19 I THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, you understand if 
20 your attorney withdraws today pursuant to this request, 
21 this trial will not go forward today? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. I 
23 would hope it wouldn't take too much longer than a 
24 reasonable amount of time to reschedule it. I feel like I 
25 shouldn't be punished any more than I already have by a 
1 hundred thousand dollars bail that we could be able to 
2 reschedule this and get to go on in a reasonable amount of 
3 time. 
4 THE COURT: Earliest I can do it is February 
5 12. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: I believe the other trial was 
7 scheduled for— 
8 I MR. ANDERSON: 16th of January. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: 16th of January. 
10 THE COURT: I don't care what the other trial 
11 was set for. I am telling you the first available date I 
12 have, I don't have the matters that have precedent over 
13 that February 12, if you will waive your rights to a 
14 speedy trial? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Does that mean I have to stay 
16 in jail until February 12? 
17 THE COURT: In all likelihood, otherwise, you 
18 wouldn't have a speedy trial— you don't get it both ways. 
19 Mr. Strahm, this case has been continued numerous times 
20 usually for reasons that it's not the responsibility of 
21 the State if you want me to continue it again, so I can 
22 consider getting you another attorney, that's the best I 
23 can do for you. And if that's not acceptable, then let's 
24 try the case. 
25 THE DEFENDANT: What date would that be? 
1 THE COURT: February 12. 
2 THE DEFENDANT: What if I decided to keep Mr. 
3 Anderson as my attorney? 
4 THE COURT: Or I can get you some other 
5 clothes. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Let's go on with it then, 
7 Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay let's do it. All right. I 
9 think what I will do is this I think I will have the jury 
10 come back in the morning. I don't want to keep them 
11 waiting any longer. Nine-thirty in the morning work? 
12 MR. LEMCKE: A couple things. First of all, 
13 defendant stated the clothes he had before were wrinkled. 
14 Would the court ask him if in fact they were pressed or 
15 laundered if they would be acceptable clothes? 
16 THE COURT: If they aren't, they wouldn't be 
17 J acceptable, let's put it that way. Mr. Anderson, I guess 
18 you can't withdraw. Your client won't waive his speedy 
19 trial rights. I wouldn't require him to do that. You are 
20 prepared. I guess you will have to do the best you can, 
21 start tomorrow at nine-thirty and, Mr. Lemcke, I need your 
22 assistance with regard to the jail to see that his 
23 clothing is laundered so that— 
24 MR. LEMCKE: I will do what I can, if counsel 
25 can help me locate where they are at the moment. 
8 
THE COURT: I want somebody to tell the jail 
to do that. 
MR. LEMCKE: We will do it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, this case will go 
tomorrow at nine-thirty tomorrow morning. This will go 
regardless. I will see you then. 
******** 
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